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I. INTRODUCTION
When a court finds an entitlement' statute sufficiently under-
inclusive2 to be unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, the
court must provide a remedy.' Deciding which remedy is appropri-
ate has plagued both U.S. and Canadian courts because applying
traditional maxims of statutory construction and elision 4 would
only leave everyone out in the cold' until the legislature re-enacted
a constitutional version of the statute.
To circumvent this problem courts have often broadened stat-
utes to include classes that the legislature never intended, while at
the same time purporting to give effect to the legislature's intent.
The courts of both the United States and Canada believe that
adopting the legislatures' preferred remedy is their proper func-
tion.e Canada has adopted a methodology that uses legislative in-
tent along with constitutional normative values to read new lan-
guage into an underinclusive entitlement statute to save it from
nullification. Courts in the United States have not explicitly
1. An entitlement is a "[might to benefits, income or property which may not be
abridged without due process." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 532 (6th ed. 1990). This Comment
focuses on statutory government benefits, such as social security, disability, medical, wel-
fare, housing, and family leave benefits.
2. A statute is underinclusive when it contains a classification which does not include
all persons similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 348 (1949).
3. See generally Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1112-16
(1969).
4. The general rule for a court's proper remedial function is to strike down offensive
legislation, either in whole, or in part if removing the offending part does not eviscerate the
statute. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
5. For example, if the Court failed to extend the statute considered in Califano v. West-
cott, 443 U.S. 76, 82 (1979), children of unemployed women might literally have found
themselves out in the cold. See infra part III.C.
6. See infra part IV.
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adopted this position, but similarly have neutralized discrimina-
tory language in statutes by changing the classifications.
This Comment, in contrasting the Canadian doctrinal ap-
proach announced in Schachter v. Canada7 to current U.S. meth-
odology argues that courts should generally declare the statute in-
valid and leave its repair to the legislature by delaying judgment.
Part II on Canadian Law and Part III on U.S. law detail each
country's current methodology. Part IV contrasts the relative roles
of the judiciary and the legislature to explain why courts step
outside their institutional sphere when they make the decision to
extend or nullify. Part V explores judicial treatment of legislative
intent. Part VI scrutinizes U.S. standing doctrine to determine
whether differences in the views of the U.S. and Canadian courts
stem from differing normative assumptions of the judiciary's mis-
sion. Part VII contrasts the remedial alternatives, and Part VIII
proposes the solution of delayed enforcement for both Canada and
the United States.
II. THE CANADIAN DOCTRINAL APPROACH: SCHACHTER V. CANADA
In Schachter v. Canada,8 the Supreme Court of Canada ad-
dressed the question of whether a court can properly broaden the
class of recipients rather than strike down legislation that offends
equal protection. In Schachter, the Unemployment Insurance Act
of 1971' granted one adoptive parent of either sex up to 15 weeks
of benefits to care for a newly adopted child. Natural0 parents,
however, received a less flexible entitlement. A separate statute
provided similar benefits for natural mothers, but allowed the nat-
ural father to receive benefits only if the mother was disabled or
deceased."
Two natural parents challenged the statute on equal protec-
7. 93 D.L.R.4th 1 (1992).
8. Id. at 10.
9. Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, ch. 48, § 30, 1970-1972 S.C. 996, amended by
ch. 150, § 4, 1980-1983 S.C. 4166 (current version at R.S.C. ch. U-1, § 18 (1985), amended by
ch. 40, § 12, 1990 S.C. 762); Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, ch. 48, § 32, 1970-1972 S.C.
998, amended by ch. 150, § 5(1), 1980-1983 S.C. 4167 (current version at R.S.C. ch. U-I, §
20(1) (1985), amended by ch. 40, § 14, 1990 S.C. 763) (Can.).
10. 93 D.L.R.4th at 6-7 (the Court labelled the biological parents "natural" parents).
11. See Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, ch. 48, § 32, 1970-1972 S.C. 998, amended
by ch. 150, § 5(1), 1980-1983 S.C. 4167 (current version at R.S.C. ch. U-1, § 20(1) (1985),
amended by ch. 40, § 14, 1990 S.C. 763) (Can.).
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tion grounds.'" The Federal Court, Trial Division, found that sec-
tion 32 of the statute violated section 15 the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms because section 32 discriminated between
natural and adoptive parents with respect to parental leave.13 The
Federal Court of Appeal affirmed.1 4 By the time the case reached
the Supreme Court of Canada, the remedial issue was moot be-
cause the legislature had already amended the statute to include
natural parents.' 5 The Court, however, still heard the appeal, and
though it denied relief to the plaintiffs, it awarded them costs"
and announced a new remedial approach.
17
The Court focused on whether the enacting legislature would
have passed the benefits in the Court's remedied form.18 It also
balanced this policy of legislative deference with the need to fulfil
the purposes of the Charter. The Court discussed three remedial
alternatives and several extrinsic factors which future courts could
use in determining the proper result. The remainder of this part
highlights the Schachter Court's analysis.
A. A.1cadin Do.Lwn&
The Court began by affirming that section 52 of the Constitu-
12. 93 D.L.R.4th at 6.
13. [1988] 3 F.C. 515 (Fed. Ct.) (granting declaratory relief under § 24(1) of the Charter
and extending to natural parents the same benefits granted to adoptive parents under § 32
of the Unemployment Insurance Act).
14. [1990] 2 F.C. 129 (Fed. Ct. App.).
15. See Act to Amend the Unemployment Insurance Act, ch. 40, §§ 12, 14, 1990 S.C.
762 (Can.). The Court took this factor into account in its decision. 93 D.L.R.4th at 7.
16. 93 D.L.R.4th at 33.
17. Id. at 27-32. Since the remedial issue was moot by the time it reached the Supreme
Court of Canada, the approach set down by the Court is entirely dicta. All the Justices,
concurring and majority, were concerned that the Court was handling the question entirely
in the abstract.
It is interesting to note that because the factual dispute was moot, there is no one to
complain about the Court's using its new remedy of reading in. The legislature may not
complain too loudly, since this decision had no actual effect. The Court amended no statute
in its ruling. The litigants received tangible relief because the legislature amended the stat-
ute to include their class and because the Court awarded them litigation costs. Everyone
prefers that entitlements be extended, rather than nullified, where possible. Yet, this case
now stands as a precedent for the remedy of reading in. Query whether the Court's selecting
a moot entitlement case to assert this new remedy was a way for it to step in and seize
power from a vacuum. That question, although worthy of discussion, is beyond the scope of
this article.
18. Id. at 14-15, 22, 24-25.
19. Id. at 13-25.
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tion Act, 198220 mandates that any law inconsistent with the Con-
stitution be struck down, but only "to the extent of the inconsis-
tency."21 Like U.S. courts, Canadian courts strike down laws only
as a last resort and preserve the parts that do not offend the Con-
stitution.22 The objective is to preserve as much of the legislative
intent behind the statute as possible.28
The doctrine of severance in Canadian courts is an ordinary
part of constitutional adjudication. 2 ' Like U.S. courts, Canadian
courts will not sever a clause from a statute when the remainder is
so inextricably bound to the invalid part that the remainder can-
not survive independently.25 Nor will courts sever a clause if they
determine that the legislature would not have enacted the statute
without the invalid portion.26
B. Reading In
In Schachter, the Canadian Supreme Court announced that
the justifications for severing a statute apply equally to a remedy
that it termed "reading in. '27 In the case of severance, the consti-
tutional infirmity is due to that which is improperly included in a
statute.28 In the case of reading in, the constitutional infirmity is
due to that which is wrongly excluded.
2
9
The Schachter Court held that if a statute is found unconsti-
tutional, a court can extend the reach of the statute by reading in
20. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 52 [hereinafter CAN. CONST.].
21. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 11. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides an
additional remedy, exclusive of § 52. Section 24 of the Charter provides the courts with the
power to grant an "appropriate and just" remedy to "[a]nyone whose [Charter] rights and
freedoms . . . have been infringed or denied." CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 24(1). The Court held
that utilizing § 24 to grant a remedy, rather than § 52, would be appropriate when the
statute was not unconstitutional on its face, but in its application. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th
at 33. Section 24(1) would provide an individual remedy for the person whose rights were
infringed. Id. at 34.
22. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 11.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. For the Canadian test for severance, see Attorney General for Alberta v. Attor-
ney General for Canada, 4 D.L.R. 1, 11 (1947), cited with approval in Schachter, 93
D.L.R.4th at 12. For the U.S. test for severance, see, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480
U.S. 678 (1987).
27. 93 D.L.R.4th at 12-i4.
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id. at 12-14.
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new language3 0 The Court stated "[i]t would be an arbitrary dis-
tinction to treat inclusively and exclusively worded statutes differ-
ently. To do so would create a situation where the style of drafting
would be the single critical factor in the determination of a rem-
edy[, an approach which] is entirely inappropriate.""1 Rather,
"[o]nce a person has demonstrated that a particular law infringes
his or her Charter rights, the manner in which the law is drafted or
stated ought to be irrelevant for the purposes of a constitutional
remedy." '
The Schachter Court thus assumed that there is no logical dif-
ference between severing language from a statute and inserting
new language." The majority's reasoning does not confine the ap-
plication of this remedy to underinclusive entitlement statutes,
and thus, the Court may seek to apply it in future cases as a gen-
eral remedial method.
34
The Court claimed that nothing in section 52 suggests that
courts must be restricted to the "verbal formula" employed by the
legislature.35 Rather, whether a court strikes out language or reads
30. Id.
31. Id. at 13.
32. Id. (quoting Knodel v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), 58
B.C.L.R.2d 356, 388 (1991) (Can.)). "To hold otherwise would result in a statutory provision
dictating the interpretation of the Constitution." Id. (quoting Knodel, 58 B.C.L.R.2d at
388).
33. 93 D.L.R.4th at 13. The Court quoted a passage from Knodel in making this
assertion:
[Wihere B's Charter right to a[n equal] benefit is demonstrated, it is immaterial
whether the subject law states: (1) A benefits; or (2) Everyone benefits except B.
The first example would require the court to "read in" the words "and B,"
while the second example would require the court to "strike out" the words "ex-
cept B." In each case, the result would be identical.
Id. (quoting Knodel, 58 B.C.L.R.2d at 388).
34. The Court, stated:
Reading in should therefore be recognized as a legitimate remedy akin to sever-
ance and should be available under a. 52 in cases where it is an appropriate
technique to fulfil the purposes of the Charter and at the same time minimize
the interference of the court with the parts of legislation that do not themselves
violate the Charter.
93 D.L.R.4th at 16.
35. Id. at 13. The Court reasoned:
Section 52 does not say that the words expressing a law are of no force or effect
to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Constitution. It says that a law
is of no force or effect to the extent of the inconsistency. Therefore, the inconsis-
tency can be defined as what is left out of the verbal formula as well as what is
wrongly included.
Id.
The extent of the inconsistency can be defined in substantive, rather than merely verbal
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in new language, the focus "should be on the appropriate remedy
in the circumstances and not on the label used to arrive at the
result."36 The Court feared that if the remedy of reading in was
unavailable under the Charter, it would frustrate the social pur-
poses that the Charter was enacted to secure."
To determine which remedy is proper according to the check-
list in Schachter, a court must first define the extent of the infir-
mity. 8 It must then determine whether that infirmity may best be
dealt with by way of severance, reading in, or nullification.
3 9
Under the Schachter approach, courts should not read in
where "there is no manner of extension which flows with sufficient
precision from the requirements of the Constitution.' Thus, if a
court cannot determine what new language is appropriate to com-
ply with both legislative intent and constitutional requirements, it
should defer to the legislature. 1 A remedy which so substantially
intrudes into budgetary policy that it changes the nature of the
legislative scheme is inappropriate for the judiciary to apply.42
Hence, a court must consider budgetary repercussions.4 3 As any
remedy will have some budgetary impact, "the question is not
whether courts can make decisions that impact on budgetary pol-
icy, it is to what degree they can appropriately do so." 4" Finally,
terms. Id. (citing Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (where the extent of the
inconsistency was defined conceptually rather than in the manner in which the statute was
drafted)); see also, Evan H. Caminker, A Norm Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive
Statutes, 95 YALE L.J. 1185 (1986) (advocating a similar approach for U.S. courts).
36. 93 D.L.R.4th at 13 (quoting Knodel, 58 B.C.L.R.2d at 388).
37. 93 D.L.R.4th at 15; see also Phillips v. Social Assistance Appeal Bd., 73 N.S.R.2d
415 (1986) (holding that the court could not extend welfare benefits to single fathers from a
statute which provided benefits only to single mothers because § 15 of the Charter merely
requires equal benefits, and thus the only option was for the court to nullify the benefits to
single mothers, frustrating the purpose of the Charter); Nitya Duclos & Kent Roach, Consti-
tutional Remedies as "Constitutional Hints": A Comment on R. v. Schachter, 36 McGnL
L.J. 1 (1991).
38. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 16. The Court adopted the test from R. v. Oakes, [1986]
1 S.C.R. 103, for this purpose.
39. 93 D.L.R.4th at 18.
40. Id. at 19; see also Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 168-69 (holding that
establishing a scheme of procedural safeguards is inappropriate for the courts); Rocket v.
Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ont., 71 D.L.R.4th 68 (1990) (holding that drafting
rules to allow for only legitimate advertising would be a complex endeavor that courts could
not accomplish with precision).
41. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 19.
42. Id. at 21; see also, Andr~e Lajoie, De l'Interventionnisme judiciaire comne apport
Sl'46mergence des droits sociaux, 36 McGM.L LJ. 1338, 1344-45 (1991).
43. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 21.
44. Id.
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courts should not read in when the legislature's choice of means is
"unequivocal." Furthering "the objective of the legislative scheme
through different means would constitute an unwarranted intru-
sion into the legislative domain.""
In choosing extension or nullification, courts should also look
to the relative sizes of the favored and the excluded groups.
46
Where the excluded group is much smaller than the favored group,
extending the benefits rather than nullifying them will usually be
far less intrusive upon the legislation. 7 Extension to a relatively
small group will not generally result in a significant change in the
entitlement program. In contrast, if the excluded group is much
larger than the favored group, extension may not be the appropri-
ate remedy. For budgetary reasons, or simply because it signifi-
cantly changes the program, it would be more tenuous to assume
that the enacting legislature would have passed the present benefit
scheme in its judicially amended form. 9
Courts may also consider the significance and history of the
benefit that remains"0 and whether the statute provides a protec-
tion that is "constitutionally encouraged."5' Where the government
has no obligation to provide the benefit, it may be inappropriate
45. Id. at 20-21; see also R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (Court could not read in
procedural safeguards where Parliament had deliberately left the discretion to the Lieuten-
ant Governor to decide whether to commit a person found not guilty by reason of insanity).
46. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 22.
47. Id. at 23; see also, e.g., Knodel v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission),
58 B.C.L.R.2d 356 (1991). In Knodel, the Supreme Court of British Columbia confronted
regulations under the Medical Services Act, which defined "spouse" to exclude coverage to
homosexual couples. The Court held that this classification violated § 15(1) of the Charter
because it improperly discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. Since the number of
homosexual couples was small in comparison to heterosexual couples, the Court declared
that the remedy that was "appropriate and just in the circumstances" was a declaration that
homosexual partners were included in the definition of "spouse" under the regulations.
Knodel, 58 B.C.L.R.2d at 370-92.
48. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 23. Even when the excluded group is very large, exten-
sion is sometimes appropriate. See, e.g., R. v. Hebb, 89 N.S.R.2d 137 (1989) (where the court
ordered that persons over 65 receive the benefits that Parliament explicitly restricted to
persons under 65).
49. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 23.
50. Id. at 23-25; see also Rossow v. B.C. (A.G.), 35 B.C.L.R.2d 29, 34-35 (1989) (holding
that it was safe to assume the legislature would have enacted the permissible portion with-
out the impermissible portion due to the long period of time that the provision had been in
force).
51. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 24; see also R. v. Hebb, 89 N.S.R.2d 137 (1989) (holding
that though both severance and nullification would interfere with the intent of Parliament,
extension should be favored because the protection in question was "constitutionally en-
couraged"); Duclos & Roach, supra note 37, at 23-38; Caminker, supra note 35, at 1192-93.
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for the court to extend it.52
C. Delayed Enforcement
The Schachter Court also discussed a third remedy: tempo-
rary suspension of the invalid portion of the statute. 3 In applying
this remedy, a court would declare the legislation or provision un-
constitutional, but suspend the effect of the declaration until Par-
liament could repair the legislation." This remedy, according to
the Court, is appropriate where striking down the provision poses a
potential danger to the public," threatens the rule of law,56 or re-
sults only in the deprivation of benefits from deserving persons
without benefiting those whose rights were violated.
5 7
The Court cautioned that delaying the effect of a declaration
of unconstitutionality is a serious matter since it allows a violation
of the standards embodied in the Charter to continue for a period
of time. 8 It also infringes upon the legislature's domain by forcing
the matter onto the legislative agenda at a time and in a manner
not of the legislature's choosing. 59 However, the Court declared
that considerations of how the remedy could affect the public
would prevail over the institutional roles of the courts and the
legislature.60
D. The Concurring Opinion
Though the concurring Justices in Schachter agreed that read-
ing in "substantially amounts to the same thing" as severance, 61
they emphasized that since Parliament had already amended sec-
tion 32, the issue was moot and the Court should not elaborate
entirely in the abstract.62 These Justices cautioned against using
52. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 26.
53. Id. at 25.
54. Id. at 26.
55. Id.; see also R. v. Swain, [19911 1 S.C.R. 933.
56. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 26; see also Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1
S.C.R. 721.
57. Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 26.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 26-27.
60. Id. at 27. The Court indicated that it may have delayed enforcement in Schachter if
the issue had not been moot.
61. Id. at 34.
62. Id.
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the new remedy in contexts other than cases "involving a scheme
of social assistance." 3 They asserted that:
it is for Parliament and the legislatures to make laws. It is the
duty of the courts to see that those laws conform to constitu-
tional norms and declare them invalid if they do not .... Reli-
ance should not be placed on the courts to repair invalid laws.
4
III. THE U.S. DOCTRINAL APPROACH
In the United States, courts generally construe statutes to
avoid constitutional difficulty whenever "fairly possible." 5 This
maxim has often led courts to warp the meaning of a statute to
avoid rendering it unconstitutional.6 Nevertheless, the general rule
is that courts may not rewrite statutes to make them constitu-
tional. 7 Courts must apply the statute as drafted. If the statute
violates constitutional provisions, courts must invalidate it, but
only to the extent that the statute violates the Constitution."8
Although extension is generally not an appropriate judicial
remedy," the Supreme Court has carved out a narrow exception
for statutes challenged on equal protection grounds. ° Courts may,
where appropriate, extend the benefits of a statute to an excluded
class.71 Courts can extend the benefits by severing the language
that limits the class, by reading this language very broadly to
63. Id.
64. Id. at 35.
65. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). When a statute is "'readily susceptible'
to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional, it will be upheld." Virginia v.
American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)). "[E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to
save a statute from unconstitutionality." Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Although "[tihe canon of con-
struction that a court should strive to interpret a statute in a way that will avoid an uncon-
stitutional construction is useful in close cases . . it is 'not a license for the judiciary to
rewrite language enacted by the legislature."' Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919,
1927 (1991) (quoting United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989)). Statutes are also
construed to avoid constitutional questions. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 122
(1979); see also NORMAN SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 45.11 (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION].
66. See infra part III.A.
67. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
68. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 515-16 (1926).
69. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991) (refusing to
extend a statute which granted attorney's fees in civil rights cases).
70. See infra notes 87-91, 99-101 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 87-91, 99-101 and accompanying text.
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sneak in the disfavored class, or by neutralizing the discriminatory
words.
7 2
In practice, U.S. courts nearly always extend rather than nul-
lify. Yet, U.S. court decisions are often inconsistent in both their
reasoning and their result.75 Many of the relevant decisions omit
any discussion of the remedy." Those which do look to different
factors.75 To glean an insight into how U.S. courts address this
question, this section presents cases in which courts have at-
tempted to formulate a doctrinal approach for remedying underin-
clusive statutes.
A. Welsh v. United States
The modern invalidation versus extension debate began when
Justice Harlan, in Welsh v. United States7 advocated extension
as a remedy in constitutional cases." Welsh involved a federal
statute78 which exempted from military service persons who were
conscientiously opposed to war due to their religious beliefs. The
majority construed religious beliefs to include moral or ethical op-
position to war." Thus, to avoid striking down the statute, the
Court expanded the class of persons subject to the statute by
broadening the definition of the legislative classification.
Justice Harlan believed that this was a perversion of statutory
interpretation, and in his concurrence, he urged the Court to admit
that it was not construing the statute, but extending it.80 Justice
Harlan advocated that extension was an entirely appropriate rem-
edy in this case and so should be accomplished openly."' He pro-
posed the following test:
72. See infra part III.B. One could argue that when a court makes a legislative classifi-
cation gender neutral, it has, in effect, inserted language into the statute.
73. Candice S. Kovacic, Remedying Underinclusive Statutes, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 39, 49-
56 (1986) (detailing the relevant case law and coming to the conclusion that "[t]his makes
comparability of cases difficult, and predictability from precedent elusive").
74. Id. at 56.
75. Id. at 57.
76. 398 U.S. 333, 364 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 361.
78. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612
(1948) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (Supp. IV 1964)).
79. 398 U.S. at 342. Specifically, the Court held that a person's conscientious objection
to war is "religious" even when motivated by moral or philosophical views. Id. at 343-44.
80. Id. at 355-56 (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 365-66.
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Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there ex-
ist two remedial alternatives: a court may either declare it a nul-
lity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the
legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of
the statute to include those who are aggrieved by the
exclusion."5
B. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,83 The Court found unconstitu-
tional a provision of the Social Security Act which authorized
"child in care" payments to the widow of a male wage earner, but
did not provide benefits to a similarly situated widower."' To rem-
edy the statute, the Court, in effect, substituted the word "parent"
for "mother.""s The majority found support for its conclusion in
the legislative history which made clear that the underlying pur-
pose of the entitlement was to provide children deprived of one
parent with the opportunity for the personal attention of the
other."6
C. Califano v. Westcott
The Supreme Court in Califano v. Westcotts7 again con-
fronted an underinclusive statute which could avoid nullification
only if the Court modified the legislative classification. The Court
unanimously adopted Harlan's test from Welsh,88 although it split
five to four on the choice of whether to nullify or extend. The stat-
ute under reviews ' granted benefits to unemployed fathers with
82. Id. at 361.
83. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
84. Id. at 637-38.
85. Id. at 652-53. Courts commonly neutralize gender-based language to remedy equal
protection violations. See, e.g., Califano v. Jablon, 430 U.S. 924 (1977) (spousal benefits),
summarily aff'g 399 F. Supp. 118 (D.C. Md. 1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
(survivor's benefits); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (military quarters al-
lowances and medical and dental benefits); In re Jessie C., 164 A.D.2d 731, 735 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991) (striking a gender exemption to preserve a statute because "given a choice be-
tween striking the gender bias or striking the statute in its entirety, the Legislature ...
would opt to gender-neutralize").
86. 420 U.S. at 648-49.
87. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
88. Id. at 89.
89. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 407, 80 Stat. 882 (1968)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1991)).
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children, but not to similarly situated unemployed mothers. The
Westcott Court remedied the statute by extending the benefits to
the unemployed mothers.90 In essence, the Court, by affirming the
district court's opinion, replaced "father" in the statute with its
gender-neutral equivalent, "parent." e
The Court also rejected a middle-ground solution. 2 The Com-
missioner of Massachusetts sought to modify the district court's
order by asking the Supreme Court to insert the words "principle
wage-earner" into the statute."' Granting benefits only to the chil-
dren of an unemployed principle wage-earner would have provided
a gender-neutral solution and greatly reduced the added costs by
decreasing the number of elgible recipients. 4 Concerned that the
Commissioner's proposal "would involve a restructuring of the Act
that a court should not undertake lightly," ' the Supreme Court
rejected this position. It reasoned that "[w]henever a court extends
benefits to a program to redress unconstitutional underinclusive-
ness, it risks infringing legislative prerogatives." '96 Inserting the
words "principle wage-earner" would have also required the Court
to redefine the meaning of "unemployment" within the Act,
9
7
which it was unwilling to do.9"
The Court expanded the program because it saw the remedy
of extension as generally more consistent with the congressional in-
tent than nullification.9 9 The Court further recognized that al-
though the choice between "extension" and "nullification" is
within the "constitutional competence of a federal district
90. 443 U.S. at 92.
91. Id. This is, of course, similar to the Canadian remedy of reading in.





97. Id. at 92-93.
98. Id. Interestingly, Congress amended the statute in 1981, adopting the "principal
earner" solution. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35 §§
2313(a)(2), 2313(a)(3), 95 Stat. 853 (1981) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1992)).
99. 443 U.S. at 91-93. The Court considered extension to be the "simplest and most
equitable" remedy. Id. at 93. Suspending the program would impose hardships on those
needy children which Congress intended to protect. Id. at 89. The Act's severability clause
evidenced an intent to maintain social welfare programs whenever possible. Id. None of the
parties to the litigation were seeking nullification, and previous Supreme Court decisions
had "routinely . . . affirmed district court judgments ordering extension of federal welfare
programs." Id. at 91.
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court," 100 ordinarily "extension, rather than nullification, is the
proper course." 101
Four Justices, dissenting in part, argued nullification was the
proper remedy because the legislative history afforded no basis for
determining what Congress would have done in enacting the stat-
ute had it known the statute would later be declared unconstitu-
tional due to underinclusion. 10 2 The dissenters were also concerned
that extending the benefit to new classes of persons might bring
hardship to the current beneficiaries due to limited funding. 03
They argued that Congress could mitigate any hardship caused by
nullification by quickly reinstating the program in a constitutional
form "providing promptly for retroactive payments." 10 " The fact
that none of the parties were seeking nullification was irrelevant
because the "issue should turn on the intent of Congress, not the
interests of the parties."'0 6 Further, the dissenters were troubled
that the relief ordered by the Court "ensure[d] the irretrievable
payment of funds to a class of- recipients Congress did not wish to
benefit."'1 6 They stressed that even if extension is ordinarily the
proper course, the Court "should not use its remedial powers to
circumvent the intent of the legislature."'07
The dissenters believed the better approach was, once the
Court declared the statute unconstitutional as underinclusive, the
legislative branch should make its own decision in light of the judi-
cial opinion by making whatever changes it deemed appropriate. 10 8
The dissenters worried that in cases where the allocation and dis-
tribution of funds would be affected, courts would be overstepping
their bounds because "the allocation and distribution of. . . funds
are peculiarly within the province of the Legislative Branch."'' 09
Extension of benefits by definition results in additional costs, and
thus such a decree by the judiciary was tantamount to ordering an
allocation of funds.
100. 443 U.S. at 91.
101. Id. at 89.
102. Id. at 95-96 (Powell, J., dissenting in part); see also infra part V.A.
103. 443 U.S. at 96.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 96 n.2.
106. Id. at 96.
107. Id. at 94.
108. Id. at 95.
109. Id. The dissenters cite Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 479 (1977); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), for this contention.
443 U.S. at 95.
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D. Heckler v. Mathews
The Supreme Court faced a similar question in Heckler v. Ma-
thews.110 The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
ruled that a provision of the 1977 Social Security Amendments11
violated equal protection due to underinclusiveness.'" 2 The amend-
ments excepted certain dependent women from an offset of retire-
ment benefits against Social Security spousal benefits, but did not
except similarly situated men." 8 In this statute, the legislature had
"clearly expressed its preference for nullification""" by including a
severability clause which specifically referred to the discriminatory
provision and which urged nullification if the judiciary were to de-
clare the provision unconstitutional. 15
Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, re-
versed two of the district court's findings: that the statute violated
equal protection; and that the statute's severability clause was un-
constitutional." 6 The Court held that the statute did not violate
equal protection because the classification was substantially re-
lated to the achievement of an important government objective:
protecting the reliance interests of beneficiaries." 7
Although the Court did not have to fashion a remedy because
it upheld the statute, it was forced to address the remedial issue to
determine whether the plaintiff had standing. The Court defined
the injury as the stigmatization caused by gender discrimination,
not the denial of Social Security benefits."$ Justice Brennan rea-
110. 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
111. Social Security Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(4)(A), 402(c)(2)(A),
402(n) (1982). Congress enacted these amendments partly in response to the Court's deci-
sion in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), which held that a gender-based classifica-
tion in the spousal-benefit provisions of the Social Security Act violated the right to equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Ma-
thews, 465 U.S. at 731-32.
112. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 731.
113. Id. at 731-34.
114. Id. at 739 n.5.
115. Id. at 738.
116. Id. at 737-39.
117. Id. at 748.
118. Id. at 739-40. The Court wrote:
[T]he right to equal treatment guaranteed by the Constitution is not co-exten-
sive with any substantive rights to the benefits denied the party discriminated
against. Rather, as we have repeatedly emphasized, discrimination itself, by per-
petuating "archaic and stereotypic notions" or by stigmatizing members of the
disfavored group as "innately inferior" and therefore as less worthy participants
in the political community can cause serious non-economic injuries ....
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soned that since the right invoked was equal protection, the appro-
priate remedy was "a mandate of equal treatment, a result that
can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored
class as well as by extension of benefits to the excluded class.""'
By defining the injury as stigmatization, the Court was able to
grant standing because it was possible to redress the stigmatization
through nullification.1l 0 The Court also avoided a clash with Con-
gress by proposing a remedy consistent with the severability clause
that expressed a preference for nullification.
E. Federal Courts and State Entitlement Statutes
When a case involves a state entitlement statute, the Supreme
Court normally identifies the equal protection problem but re-
mands to the state court to decide whether the class should be ex-
panded or whether the benefit should be nullified. 2' In some cases,




Commentators have sharply criticized basing the injury on the effects of discrimination
rather than the loss of entitlements. For a thorough critique of the Mathews decision, see
Bruce K. Miller, Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical Ap-
praisal of Heckler v. Mathews, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1985) [hereinafter Miller,
Constitutional Remedies]; Bruce K. Miller & Neal E. Devins, Constitutional Rights With-
out Remedies: Judicial Review of Underinclusive Legislation, 70 JUDICATURE 151 (1986).
However, these criticisms are unwarranted due to concerns raised by the standing doctrine.
See infra part VI.
119. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 740 (citing Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S.
239, 247 (1931)). The Court re-affirmed that though ordinarily "'extension, rather than nul-
lification, is the proper course,' the court should not, of course, 'use its remedial powers to
circumvent the intent of the legislature' and should therefore '. . . consider the degree of
potential disruption of the statutory scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to
abrogation.'" Mathews, 465 U.S. at 739 n.5 (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 76,
89, 94 (1979)).
120. Id. at 740; see also infra part VI.
121. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (statute which
provided widows with a presumption of dependency upon their spouses for worker's com-
pensation declared unconstitutional but remanded to state to decide whether to include
widowers or invalidate the presumption); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (finding an Ala-
bama law allowing alimony to wives but not to husbands unconstitutional on equal protec-
tion grounds but remanded for the state to decide whether to extend or nullify the benefit).
122. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (one-year residence
requirement for county-paid medical care violated equal protection); Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535 (1973) (benefits for children created by a state cannot be withheld from an illegiti-
mate child); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (state cannot deny
unacknowledged illegitimate children recovery under worker's compensation statute while
allowing recovery to legitimate children); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (state
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The Court generally views the revision of an underinclusive
state entitlement statute as a question of state policy, outside the
purview of the federal courts. 12  Federalism concerns force federal
courts to tread lightly when confronting the constitutionality of a
state statute."2 4 Further complicating matters is the fact that a fed-
eral court's interpretation of a state statute is not binding on a
reviewing state court.12 5
F. U.S. Courts and the Insertion of Language into Statutes
The general rule is that U.S. courts will not rewrite statutes or
insert language to remedy an unconstitutional statute.l"e However,
may not deny welfare benefits to otherwise eligible recipients simply because the residents
lived in the state for less than one year); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (once state
recognizes wrongful death recovery for child, state cannot hold that the term "child" ex-
cludes illegitimate children), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968).
123. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152-53 (1980) ("Be-
cause state legislation is at issue, and because a remedial outcome consonant with the state
legislature's overall purpose is preferable, we believe that state judges are better positioned
to choose an appropriate method of remedying the constitutional violation.").
124. See, e.g., Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1112 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
"[t]he principles of federalism forbid a federal appellate court to arrogate the power to re-
write a municipal ordinance"), aff'd, 482 U.S. 451 (1987); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 362 n.15 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has wider discretion to
extend federal law than it does to recast "a policy for the States even as a constitutional
remedy"). But see Ruth B. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Un-
constitutional Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 313 (1979) (listing several cases where
the Supreme Court has tacitly extended state legislation, theorizing that in those cases the
Court may have thought it obvious that the state legislature would want the statute to
survive).
125. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 428 (1979) (holding that this situation "render[s]
the federal-court decision advisory and the litigation underlying it meaningless").
126. "The canon favoring constructions of statutes to avoid constitutional questions
does not . . . license a court to usurp the policy-making and legislative functions of duly-
elected representatives." Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 741 (1984) (citing three cases:
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U.S. 490, 499-501, 508-511 (1979); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 693 (1948));
see also West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (1991) ("[t]o supply
omissions transcends the judicial function") (quoting Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245,
250-51 (1926)); Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (stating "we
will not rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional requirements"); American To-
bacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75 (1982) (Court noted its own prior decisions that had
refused to narrow a statute by "reading into it limitations not contained in the statutory
language"); Bount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971) ("it is for Congress, not this Court, to
rewrite the statute"); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964) (" 'Although
this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional
attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute'
...or judicially rewriting it.") (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961));
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922) (holding that adding limitations to a statute is "legis-
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courts will occasionally strain the language of a statute practically
beyond recognition in interpreting its meaning. 11 7 Courts also rou-
tinely neutralize gender-discriminatory language in statutes, even
when doing so broadens the class of persons subject to the
statute.1 8
Occasionally, the "plain meaning" of statutory language leads
to "absurd or futile results."'129 When this occurs, courts may look
"beyond the words to the purpose [of the statute]." Even if the
plain meaning does not produce absurd results "but merely an un-
reasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legisla-
tion as a whole.' """ In extreme circumstances, courts will inter-
pret and enforce a statute contrary to its literal and unambiguous
wording if the legislative intent indicates a result contrary to what
is written in the statute. 18 ' This would be the case where, for ex-
lative work beyond the power and function of the court"); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
214, 221 (1875) (holding an unconstitutionally broad penal statute could not be repaired by
the Court inserting new language because to do so "would be to make a new law, not to
enforce an old one"). But see United States v. Thirty.-Sven Ph-tographs, 402 U. , 170-
73 (1971) (where the Court, based on legislative intent, supplied time limits to forfeiture
proceedings pursuant to a federal statute).
The circuits are also in accord. See Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1127 (6th Cir.
1991) (holding federal courts when reviewing state statutes must sever and may not draft
limiting conditions so that "[tihe State may pursue its own policy choices in fashioning new
legislation"); Wilson v. NLRB, 920 F.2d 1282, 1289 (6th Cir. 1990) (calling a request for a
court to judicially redraft statutory language "a request for this court to perform a legisla-
tive function"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992); Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103,
1112 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[fjederal courts do not sit as a super state legislature"), aff'd, 482 U.S.
451 (1987); Consumer Party v. Davis, 778 F.2d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 1985) (canon to preserve
constitutionality of statutes does not "give a court a license to rewrite a statutory scheme");
Universal Amusement Co. Inc. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 172 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
federal courts "cannot judicially rewrite the Texas statutes and rules to incorporate . . .
safeguards"), aff'd, 445 U.S. 308, reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 947 (1980); see also Baird v. Bel-
lotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1006 (D. Mass. 1978) (court found it was not possible to rewrite a
statute because "[riegardless of whether a statute says too much, or too little, . . . the legis-
lature intended it to be constitutional"), af/'d, 443 U.S. 622, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887
(1979).
127. See supra part III.A.
128. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
129. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
130. Id. (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922)); see also 2A SUTH-
ERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 65, § 45.12 ("departure from the literal con-
struction of a statute is justified when such a construction would produce an absurd and
unjust result").
131. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). For a
lengthy list of citations, see Abdella v. Commissioner, 647 F.2d 487, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1981);
see also King Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 946 F.2d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1991) (reviewing the
line of cases and finding the common thread is "application of the statute was so absurd 'as
to shock the general moral or common sense' ") (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55,
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ample, a statute unqualifiedly makes escape from prison a felony,
but a prisoner breaks out because the prison is on fire. '
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE ROLES OF THE JUDICIARY AND
THE LEGISLATURE
Nearly two centuries ago the United States Supreme Court de-
clared in Marbury v. Madison that it is inherently the province of
the judiciary "to say what the law is."' 8 3 Utilizing this authority,
U.S. courts have assumed broad remedial powers when faced with
legislation that conflicts with the letter or the spirit of the Consti-
tution.3 4 Canadian courts have taken on a similar, if not more ac-
tivist, role in constitutional adjudication."'
In both the Canadian and U.S. schemes, legislatures are pri-
marily responsible for formulating policy, enacting law, and appro-
priating funding."' Courts will generally give legislative intent
great deference and presume that the legislature intended to create
a constitutional law.1 37 This is proper to maintain a system of
checks and balances. Courts have the power to review acts of the
legislature, but whenever possible must enforce the legislation. Be-
cause legislators represent the democratic will, courts should not
lightly venture to tread upon the expression of legislative intent.
When the legislature creates an entitlement, it must debate
fundamental aspects of policy, the most critical of which is fund-
ing. Legislatures must carefully consider the number of people who
will receive the new benefits, the costs of the benefits, and the pro-
60 (1930)); 2A SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 65, § 45.12.
132. See Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 461.
133. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
134. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988).
135. See David Beatty, Human Rights and Constitutional Review in Canada, 13 HuM.
RTS. L.J. 185 (1992); see also R. v. Oakes, [19861 1 S.C.R. 103 (providing an analytical frame-
work within which to measure the constitutionality of any law under review).
136. See generally PETER W. HOGO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 79-88 (2d ed.
1977). The U.S. system of government is tripartite, with each branch having defined func-
tions delegated to it by the Constitution. "While '[i]t is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is,' it is equally-and emphatically-the
exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative polices and mandate
programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation." Tennes-
see Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
137. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 355 (1970); see also supra notes 65-68
and accompanying text. For a list of additional cases, see 2A SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION, supra note 65, § 45.11.
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cedure for disbursing the benefits.88
When courts extend entitlements to new groups of persons
they usurp this process. Courts are not in as good a position to
determine proper costs, funding, and implementation; these are
legislative tasks. 13e Moreover, by enacting the entitlement in the
first place, the legislature has already made the decision of how to
maximize the distribution of limited resources." 0 When a court or-
ders that a class be expanded, it is judicially redrafting that legis-
lation, regardless of the gloss it gives its reasoning by using a con-
sequentialist perspective.
An expanded class will cost more, both in the actual benefits
paid out and in administrative costs. When a court greatly expands
class size, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature would find
its existing scheme of distribution inadequate. 1 Since the legisla-
ture must pay the additional costs resulting from the extension,
the court is also, in effect, ordering the legislature to make an
appropriation."4
Although deference to the legi letive process is important,
what about the interests of recipients whose benefits are cut when
a court declares the statute discriminatory? These recipients may
have come to rely on the benefits for their daily survival, 4" and
they would suffer great hardship from the loss. They are not re-
sponsible for the legislature's discriminatory classification. This
concern has caused the courts of both the United States and Ca-
nada to depart from traditional remedial doctrine. The courts,
however, do not have the final word. The legislature may nullify
the statute or extend the benefits in a different fashion, so long as
the new distribution scheme is free of constitutional defects. 1"
138. See Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 311, 323, 327 (1987).
139. See Schachter v. Canada, 93 D.L.R.4th 1, 31 (1992); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S.
76, 93 (1979); see also Ross, supra note 138, at 323 ("Because courts are less able to weigh
facts and policies in a principled manner, they should abstain and defer to the legislature.").
140. Ross, supra note 138, at 323, 327.
141. See, e.g., Schachter v. Canada, 93 D.L.R.4th 1 (1992) (where the legislature prior
to the judicial resolution changed the period from 15 to 10 weeks to offset the added costs of
extension).
142. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94-95 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
143. Many entitlements provide the means of subsistence for economically disadvan-
taged persons.
144. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 (1984); see also Arthur B. LaFrance,
Problems of Relief in Equal Protection Cases, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 438, 439 (1979);
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Taking both sides into account, a better solution to this quan-
dary is for the judiciary to declare the statute or provision uncon-
stitutional, but leave its repair to the legislature: "When the court
passes on the constitutionality of a statute in [these] cases, it con-
cludes its essentially judicial business. If it declares the statute un-
constitutional as written, the remaining task is essentially
legislative."1145
V. UNCOVERING THE LEGISLATURE'S REMEDIAL INTENT: A REAL
SOLUTION OR JUST SMOKE AND MIRRORS?
When searching for the proper remedy, a court must consider
two legislative intents. The first is the underlying purpose of the
entitlement. A reviewing court may determine this purpose by ex-
amining the social purposes declared by the legislature at the time
of enactment. " " This will assist the court in determining the social
importance of the entitlement.147 The second intent at issue is the
legislature's preferred remedy-extension or nullification.
Constitutions generally require few entitlements.' 48 Entitle-
Kovacic, supra note 73, at 39, 89. But see GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 92-93 (1982). Calabresi asserts that the trouble with saying judge-made rules are
conditional and subject to legislative revision is "that, taken literally, it can justify any law,
however instituted or arrived at, so long as a legislature or other majoritarian body can
reject it. It says lawmaking by any body, of any sort, is consistent with democratic theory if
the people can have the last word." Id.
Creating an entitlement program injects a certain amount of inertia into the process.
The legislature will likely find it difficult to remove the benefits from the expanded class
once it is granted. See Caminker, supra note 35, at 1187 n.6; Kovacic, supra note 73, at 89.
145. Ginsburg, supra note 124, at 317 (1979).
146. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648-49 (1975); see also 2B SUTH-
ERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 65, § 56.01, at 303.
147. Id. But see Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YAmi
L.J. 123, 154 (1972) [hereinafter Note, Legislative Purpose] ("the discussion of a statute's
rationality [of purpose] is a meaningless and confusing exercise").
148. The United States does not recognize a fundamental right to entitlements, regard-
less of whether they are "necessities of life." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(welfare); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion or other medical treat-
ment); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing). Nor does Due Process require that
the government provide aid to its citizens. Deshaney v. Winnebego County Dep't. of Social
Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) ("the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative
right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual");
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) ("As a general matter, a state is under no
constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border."). But cf.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (suggesting there may be a right to minimal education);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) ("Public assistance ... is not mere charity, but
a means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
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ments are created because the legislature desires to grant a benefit
to a particular group of people. When courts hold an entitlement
statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, it is because
the statute does not dispense the benefits in a constitutional man-
ner, not because the Constitution prohibits or requires the bene-
fits. 14 9 Because the statute reflects a legislative desire, and not a
constitutional mandate, courts focus their remedial inquiry on leg-
islative intent.
Subpart A discusses how a court can ascertain the enacting
legislature's intent. Subpart B explores whether courts can deter-
mine which remedy the present legislature would prefer in a given
case.
A. The Enacting Legislature
This Comment questions whether courts are really uncovering
legislative intent or just waving the magician's cape. An answer to
this question requires examination of the methods that legislaturesuse to evince their int.nt. and the m-thod c urt. u to -^
legislative intent.
The primary purpose of statutory construction is to give effect
to the intent of the legislature. 150 Courts generally use four meth-
ods to determine legislative intent: Courts first examine the plain
language of the specific statutory provision;15 1 they may also con-
sider the entire statute, if appropriate;15 2 they may review the leg-
islative history;153 or finally, courts may consider a severability
and our Posterity.' ") (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.). For the view that some entitlements in
the United States are constitutionally required, see Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Pro-
tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969); Frank I.
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. L.Q. 659. But cf.
Robert H. Bork, Commentary: The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Consti-
tution, 1979 WASH L.Q. 695 (criticizing Michelnan's view). In Canada, some entitlements
are "constitutionally encouraged." See Schachter, 93 D.L.R.4th at 24-25.
149. Of course, "even where Congress need not act at all, if it chooses to act, it must act
constitutionally." LaFrance, supra note 144, at 439.
150. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
151. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975).
152. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956) ("In expounding a stat-
ute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.") (quoting United States v. Bois-
dore's Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1849)).
153. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1150 (1992) (Stevens, J., con-
curring). Courts do not ordinarily use legislative history to interpret a statute when it is
plain and unambiguous on its face. See Ex Parte Collette, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949).
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clause, if one exists."
The intent of the legislature in enacting an entitlement is
sometimes difficult, if not impossible to discern. The court will
know, a priori, that the legislature intended to grant the benefit to
the favored group. Determining the preferred legislative remedy is
another matter. 5 ' The court must determine whether the legisla-
ture would favor enlarging the scope of the entitlement to include
the new classes of persons, or whether the legislature would favor
terminating the benefit altogether. There is no middle ground. The
court cannot consider whether the legislature would prefer exten-
sion with a reduction in per capita distribution or some other cost
defraying scheme. 15
The U.S. doctrine creates, in essence, a presumption that the
legislature prefers extension," but a court may review the actual
legislative intent to rebut this presumption. The Canadian courts
share a similar view.
In the best circumstances, there would be a severability clause
which the court could consider.5 8 Yet, even severability clauses
leave room for doubt. Nearly all such clauses are general, in that
the legislature merely declares a preferred remedy in the event
that any provision of the statute is declared unconstitutional. Sev-
erability clauses generally do not address the specific provision at
issue.' 59 This is only logical, because legislatures generally do not
knowingly draft statutes with unconstitutional provisions.'
In the worst circumstances, the legislature is either silent on
its intent, or dissension among its members obscures it, allowing
reviewing judges merely to cite those legislators with whom they
agree. Unfortunately, there is usually at least some dissension, and
154. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737 (1984).
155. See, e.g., Miller, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 118, at 89-90 (concluding
that when an underinclusive statute is unconstitutional the search for the remedial prefer-
ence is probably futile).
156. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 93 (1979) ("This Court, in any event, is ill-
equipped both to estimate the relative costs of various types of coverage, and to gauge the
effect that different levels of expenditures would have upon the alleviation of human suffer-
ing."). Presumably, if a severability clause provided a clear, middle ground solution, the
Court would enforce it.
157. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 n.5 (1984); Westcott, 443 U.S. at 89.
158. Severability clauses are virtually unknown in Canada. Duclos & Roach, supra note
37, at 17.
159. See Kovacic, supra note 73, at 45.
160. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 364 (1970); see also Note, Separability
and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HAv. L. REY. 76, 98 (1937).
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in any event, most statutes represent nothing more than compro-
mise.61 In such cases, reliance on the legislature's presumed intent
is illegitimate.
162
Reviewing subsequent legislative history is also problematic in
this context because it may not reveal the legislative intent at the
time the statute was passed.6 3 It may, however, reveal what the
legislature later thought it had enacted. Theoretically a court could
reason backward, using the legislature's subsequent treatment of
the statute to show the legislature's intent at the time of enact-
ment. However, it does not necessarily follow that the statute's
later application and treatment conforms with the original legisla-
tive intent. Rather, how a legislature treats a statute subsequent to
enacting it may only be indicative of the changing policies, priori-
ties, or membership of the congress.
In some cases the legislature may actually intend to discrimi-
nate,1 64 but the court will struggle valiantly to find any possible
interpretation of the statute that would avoid conflict with the
Constitution. 6 ' Courts should face the fact that the legislature en-
161. See Note, Legislative Purpose, supra note 147, at 135.
162. See Miller, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 118, at 90 ("the legislative prefer-
ence 'discovered' in such a case is likely to be based on little more than [the judge's] per-
sonal assessment of the relative worth of social welfare legislation compared to the demands
of fiscal frugality-in other words, on the particular judge's political and social
philosophy").
163. See Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1927 n.4 (1991) ("subsequent his-
tory [is] an unreliable guide to legislative intent"); see also, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 556-57; Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1978); Note, Why Learned
Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARY. L. REv. 1005 (1992).
164. This is often the case when legislatures make distinctions based on sexual orienta-
tion, marital status, race, and gender. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979)
(holding a gender classification was "not substantially related to the attainment of any im-
portant and valid statutory goals," but rather was "part of the 'baggage of sexual stereo-
types,' that presumes the father has the 'primary responsibility to provide a home and its
essentials,' while the mother is the 'center of the home and family life' ") (quoting Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975); and then Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 n.15 (1975)). One need only review the plethora of equal pro-
tection cases to see that there is a long-standing tradition of discrimination against many
groups. The case law also demonstrates that even the courts are not immune to long-stand-
ing prejudices in society. See infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text; Kovacic, supra
note 73, at 75 ("No cases other than the widows' presumption and women's overtime cases
have inconsistent results because no other cases refused to extend underinclusive beneficial
statutes."). Kovacic also reviews several cases concerning illegitimate children, id. at 49-52,
and gender, id. at 68-75.
165. For example, in Knodel v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), 58
B.C.L.R.2d 356 (1991), the British Columbia Supreme Court held that a statute which de-
fined "spouse" to include "a man or woman who, not being married to each other, live to-
gether as husband and wife" must include homosexual couples because "[tihe use of the
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acted what it enacted and openly declare invalid any discrimina-
tory intent of the enacting legislature. Courts cannot rely on legis-
lative intent which is itself violative of equal protection or any
other constitutional protection.ee Courts, moreover, should not use
the intent of the enacting legislature to provide a remedy when the
legislature's underlying purpose was discriminatory. .Courts should
instead base their remedial decision of extension, invalidation, or
delayed enforcement on other factors, such as budgetary impact, or
the importance of the benefit to the present recipients.
16 7
The most serious problem with seeking the enacting legisla-
ture's intent is that the court is trying to determine an intent that
never existed. That is, "the court is trying to interpret a statute
that the legislature never passed." ' Courts ask whether the enact-
ing legislature would have preferred extension or nullification had
the legislature known that the statute would later be declared un-
derinclusive, or in the alternative how the enacting legislature
would have corrected the constitutional infirmity.'6
Unless there is a severability clause directly referring to the
impugned language, courts seeking to find such answers are forced
to engage in pure speculation.17 Focusing only on the intent be-
hind the benefit scheme does not reveal whether the legislature
word 'as' suggests a particular type of relationship that involves both emotional and sexual
aspects." Id. at 373. The phrase "live together as husband and wife" was "intended to ex-
clude other types of relationships that [exist] between, for example siblings or between
other adult persons who live together but who do not share an emotional and sexual com-
mitment." Id.; see also supra note 65.
166. See United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 537 (1973);
Schachter v. Canada, 93 D.L.R.4th 1, 16-17 (1992) (citing R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 295). Perhaps the fear is that if judges declare that the statute has a dis-
criminatory purpose the whole statute must fall. If true, this concern may be unwarranted,
at least in the United States. See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S.
464, 472 n.7 (1981) ("The question for us-and the only question under the Federal Consti-
tution-is whether the legislation violates [equal protection], not whether its supporters
may have endorsed it for reasons no longer generally accepted."); 2A SUTHERLAND'S STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 65 § 45.11 at 50 ("The fact that invalid motives were be-
hind what became a valid enactment will not lead to invalidation.").
167. See infra part VII.
168. See Kovacic, supra note 73, at 58.
169. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 355-56 (1970); see also People v.
Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 578 (N.Y. 1984) ("[tlhis court's task is to discern what course the
Legislature would have chosen to follow if it had foreseen our current conclusions as to
underinclusiveness"); Schmoll v. Creecy, 254 A.2d 525, 529-30 (N.J. 1969); Kovacic, supra
note 73, at 58; Ginsburg, supra note 124, at 308-10; Deborah Beers, Extension Versus Inval-
idation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative, 12 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. Paoas.
115, 121 (1975); Caminker, supra note 35, at 1188-89.
170. Kovacic, supra note 73, at 58.
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would choose extension or nullification.17 1 Recall that the court's
methodology is to change the legislative classifications by interpre-
tation, severance, or reading in.
B. The Current Legislature
Some have argued that searching for what the legislature
would have wanted at the time the statute was enacted is the
wrong inquiry. Rather, they argue, courts should determine what
the current legislature would do if it were now enacting the legisla-
tion for the first time.1" A lengthy period of time may have passed
since the legislation's enactment, the class sizes may have changed,
and reliance interests may have grown or declined considerably.
Therefore, seeking the intent of the enacting legislature could yield
results inconsistent with the present distribution scheme.
Although these are important concerns, any problems that
might exist in determining legislative intent at the time of enact-
ment are multiplied exponentially if the court applies the inquiry
proposeu uy ullese commentators. Unless the problem is put to a
vote, how is the court supposed to find the current legislature's
intent? The court may examine subsequent legislative history, but
this will generally be unrevealing. L73 The only way for the court to
really know how the current legislature would amend the statute is
to wait and see the amendment.
Were the judiciary to adopt the position of these commenta-
tors, it would be merely a pretence for judges to inject their own
views of social policy into the remedial process, for any reasoning
from this position would be mere fiction. 4 It would also expose
171. Id.
172. Id. at 57-58 ("current legislative actions are relevant in the modern approach");
Caminker, supra note 35, at 1189 n.9. But cf. Beers, supra note 169, at 128 (favoring this
approach but concluding that "it is doubtful ... that many courts would be willing to deal
with the issue in this manner").
173. See supra note 163 and accompanying text; see also West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v.
Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (1991) ("The 'will of Congress' we look to is not a will evolving
from Session to Session, but a will expressed and fixed in a particular enactment. Otherwise,
we would speak not of 'interpreting' the law but of 'intuiting' or 'predicting' it. Our role is to
say what the law, as hitherto enacted, is; not to forecast what the law, as amended, will
be."); Duclos & Roach, supra note 37, at 19 ("Trying to divine legislative intent from ... a
wide array of legislative provisions enacted at different times by different Parliaments is
manifestly futile."); cf. Clark v. Helms, 576 F. Supp. 1095 (D.N.H. 1983); Grover v. Indus.
Comm'n of Colo., 759 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1988).
174. Duclos & Roach, supra note 37, at 18.
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the judiciary to the charge of completely usurping the legislative
function.175
VI. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE PARTY SEEKING RELIEF:
STANDING
Under Canadian law, section 24 of the Charter liberally grants
standing to persons who have been denied benefits under an enti-
tlement statute. 17 6 Courts have not been so fortunate in the United
States and therefore, must grapple with this muddled doctrine. 17
The standing doctrine consists of both constitutional limita-
tions on the jurisdiction of federal courts and prudential con-
cerns. 178 Article III of the United States Constitution authorizes
federal courts to hear only cases and controversies.170 To satisfy
this requirement, courts ask whether the plaintiff has "'such a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant [the]
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify [the] exercise
of the court's remedial powers on [the plaintiff's] behalf."' 80 To
demonstrate a "personal stake" in the outcome of the litigation,
175. Id. But see Kovacic, supra note 73, at 60. Kovacic argues that since extension and
nullification both intrude into the legislative process "not wanting to usurp the legislature is
a meaningless factor and should not be considered." This argument assumes that in any
given case extension and nullification would intrude equally into the legislative scheme.
This, of course, is incorrect. Kovacic ignores extrinsic variables, such as relative class sizes
and budgetary concerns which will affect the degree of intrusion. A further consideration
arises when a severability clause is present. If the court extends where the severability
clause seeks nullification, it is certainly intruding further into the legislative process than
were it to simply nullify. Moreover, courts should not be in the business of writing legisla-
tion. See supra part IV.
176. See supra note 21. For a general explanation of the standing doctrine in Canadian
courts, see WALTER S. TARNOPOLSKY & GkRALD-A. BEAUDOIN, THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS-COMMENTARY 13-14, 493-508 (1982).
177. Interestingly however, most courts do not even address the standing problem. See
Kovacic, supra note 73, at 81. For an inquiry into third party standing, see id. at 81-88; see
generally TRIBE, supra note 134, §§ 3-14 to 3-22, at 107-56. The standing question for liti-
gants challenging underinclusive statutes is worthy of an entire law review article. "Standing
. . . is one of the most criticized doctrines of United States Constitutional Law." TRIBE,
supra note 134, at 109-10.
178. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
179. Article III, § 2 provides in relevant part: "The judicial power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States...
and to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party . U.S. CONST. art. III,
§2.
180. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962)).
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the plaintiff must have suffered "a distinct and palpable injury" '
that bears a " 'fairly traceable' causal connection" to the chal-
lenged conduct.1 82 Accordingly, "the relevant inquiry is whether
. . . the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision." ' In addition to these constitu-
tional requirements, prudential limitations which stem from the
"concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the
courts in a democratic society"' 84 allow the judiciary to deny
standing "if as a matter of judicial self-restraint it seems wise not
to entertain the case." '185
The requirement of redressability makes standing in underin-
clusive entitlement cases problematic. Courts choose nullification
or extension based on legislative intent, not the interests of the
parties.' If the remedy of extension is likely, the plaintiff will
have standing because however the injury is defined, the successful
plaintiff can receive relief: extension redresses the injury by mak-
ing the plaintiff a beneficiary or by ending any stigma caused by
the discrimination.18 7 However, if the relief is likely to be nullifica-
tion, redressability may nt h at o ld. NTulli ..cationas .are edy
redresses stigmatic injury, but it does not provide benefits to re-
dress an economic injury. Thus, a plaintiff could have a difficult
time gaining standing to challenge an underinclusive entitlement
statute if the court defines the injury as economic and continues to
have the remedial inquiry turn on legislative intent. 88
181. 422 U.S. at 501.
182. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (quot-
ing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261
(1977)).
183. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
184. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
185. 13 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at
345 (2d ed. 1984).
186. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 n.5 (1984).
187. Id. at 740 n.9 (1984); see also Kovacic, supra note 73, at 93 ("[e]xtension as the
sole remedy would also eliminate most of the standing problems").
188. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); see also
Miller, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 118, at 130. Miller argues that the injury was
mischaracterized in Welsh and Mathews as stigmatization or stereotyping rather than eco-
nomic injury so that the Supreme Court could avoid colliding with Congress over the power
to fashion constitutional remedies. Id. at 104-10. Miller also claims that severability clauses
asking for nullification are impermissible curtailments of the courts' Article III jurisdiction.
Id. at 132-41.
Miller is extremely critical of the Court's decision to base the injury on noneconomic
factors. What Miller ignores is that an entitlement statute does not create a constitutionally
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Even if the litigants establish the basic requirements of injury
in fact, causation, and redressability, they "may still lack standing
under the prudential principles by which the judiciary seeks to
avoid deciding questions of broad social import."'' However, in
Heckler v. Mathews the Court ruled that when litigants are denied
benefits that similarly situated persons receive they do not make a
general "claim of 'the right possessed by every citizen, to require
that the Government be administered according to law.' "190 This
ruling eliminates at least one major prudential hurdle.
The standing inquiry highlights one of the major differences
between the U.S. and Canadian doctrines. Courts in the United
States are reluctant to entertain challenges by citizens against gov-
ernment institutions, policies, regulations, and redistributions. The
standing doctrine requires litigants to resort to the legislative pro-
cess rather than the judiciary when the latter is not in a position to
provide a "proper" remedy. Thus, U.S. doctrine indirectly encom-
passes the ideology that the remedy determines the right. Cana-
dian courts, by ignoring standing in this context, appear to favor a
judicial philosophy that the right determines the remedy. Cana-
dian courts try to construct a remedy granting relief to the litigant,
even if they must depart from the Charter's text and resort to its
"deeper social purposes." 19'
required positive right to the benefit. The right is to equal treatment. See supra notes 119,
149 and accompanying text. Therefore, if the Court had not defined the injury as stigma, it
would have risked denying standing to litigants. If the Court had attempted to circumvent
the standing problem by providing an economic remedy to redress the litigant's economic
injury, the Court would have allowed its remedy to exceed the scope of the right to equal
treatment.
The Mathews decision has actually expanded standing in other contexts. See, e.g., Pe-
yote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991) (al-
lowing Native Americans standing to challenge a statute making peyote possession illegal on
the grounds that "[t]he Supreme Court recognizes that illegitimate unequal treatment is an
injury unto itself, 'not co-extensive with any [injury due to denial of] substantive rights to
the ...party discriminated against' ") (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739
(1984)); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Security Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361,
1368 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (granting standing based on Mathews to homosexuals challenging the
Department of Defense's policy of subjecting them to expanded investigations and
mandatory adjudications), reu'd on other grounds, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
189. Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979).
190. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 n.9 (1984) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S.
186, 208 (1962)).
191. See Schachter v. Canada, 93 D.L.R.4th 1, 15 (1992).
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VII. THE REMEDIAL ALTERNATIVES
This section contrasts the remedial alternatives proffered by
both the Canadian and U.S. doctrines and proposes a workable so-
lution to this complex problem. Each system has strengths and
weaknesses. Although similar in analysis, the U.S. doctrine is more
convoluted than the Canadian approach which offers the reviewing
court more discretion. Where one favors the discretion to rest
probably depends on one's ideological view of the relative roles of
the judiciary and the legislature.
There are essentially three remedies that a court might apply
to an underinclusive entitlement statute: (1) The court may nullify
the statute and its corresponding benefits; (2) it may extend the
benefits to cover the disfavored class; (3) the court may declare the
statute unconstitutional, but delay enforcement to allow the legis-
lature time to formulate its own remedy. When the statute in-
cludes a severability clause, courts must also determine whether
and to what extent they will enforce it.
A. Nullification of the Statute and Its Benefits
When a reviewing court nullifies an underinclusive entitlement
statute, all of its benefits cease. The legislature may then re-enact
the statute in a nondiscriminatory form with or without retroactive
payments, or it may choose not to re-enact the statute at all. This
remedy, although closest to traditional methodology, is the one
most criticized by commentators.19
Nullification's primary benefit is that it prevents the judiciary
from usurping the legislative process.193 By extending the reach of
a statute without a definitive legislative announcement, a court in-
cludes groups that the enacting legislature never intended. It is in
effect, redrafting legislation,"' incompetently acting as a legislative
proxy. 195
Courts and commentators severely criticize nullification for
three reasons. First, nullification cuts off needy persons from bene-
192. See Beers, supra note 169, at 144-45; Kovacic, supra note 73, at 45-46; Miller,
Constitutional Remedies, supra note 118, at 110-30.
193. See supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
194. See supra part IV.
195. See supra part IV.
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fits upon which they have come to rely.196 Second, nullification dis-
courages potential plaintiffs from bringing lawsuits because it de-
nies them the very benefits they were seeking, resulting only in the
denial of benefits to everyone. 197 By discouraging plaintiffs from
bringing lawsuits, nullification frustrates judicial review of under-
inclusive entitlement statutes. Third, when a court nullifies legisla-
tion, it in effect adjudicates the rights of the present recipients
who are not properly before the court. 9 ' Because of this, one com-
mentator concludes that courts should never nullify an underinclu-
sive entitlement statute.199
B. Extension of Benefits
Extension broadens the reach of an underinclusive entitlement
statute by embracing the disfavored class. A court may extend the
entitlement in four ways. First, the court may sever the restricting
language from the statute.200 Second, it may read the language of
the statute very broadly to encompass the disfavored class regard-
less of the legislative intent.20' Third, it may neutralize the dis-
criminatory language.2 02 Fourth, it may read new language into the
statute.2 0
Commentators favor extension over nullification.2 0 4 From a
utilitarian perspective, extending benefits to the disfavored group,
rather than removing them from the favored group, should do the
greatest good for the greatest number of people.205 Extension ver-
sus invalidation is a classic battle of process (the means) versus
consequences (the end).20 The end is the disbursement of benefits
196. Kovacic, supra note 73, at 89-90.
197. Miller, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 118, at 97; Beers, supra note 169, at
144.
198. LaFrance, supra note 144, at 440.
199. Id.
200. See supra part II.A.
201. See supra part Il.A.
202. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
204. See Kovacic, supra note 73, at 45 (advocating the appropriate remedy should al-
ways be extension of beneficial statutes unless a severability clause specifically requests nul-
lification); Beers, supra note 169, at 139 (advocating that the judiciary should consider ex-
tension important when the benefits themselves provide "food, shelter, and other necessities
of life") (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969)).
205. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Utility and Rights: Two Justifications for State Action
Increasing Equality, 84 YALE L.J. 39 (1974).
206. See Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36
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to needy people. The means is the legislative and judicial process
which effectuates the entitlement.
The most serious problem with extension is that increasing the
number of recipients raises the entitlement program's costs.20 7 Be-
cause the additional funding must come from somewhere,2"' exten-
sion may take money away from other important programs."'
Thus, rather than achieving the greatest good by extending, the
court may be only redistributing funds from other needed pro-
grams.210 There is only one pie, but an infinite number of ways to
slice it. The legislature is uniquely responsible for adjusting either
the size of the slices or adjusting the size of the pie.2 1  Therefore,
courts that extend the benefits of an underinclusive entitlement
statute are invading the unique province of the legislature.
When a court orders extension to the disfavored class, it also
disregards the legislature's possible preference for an intermediate
position, such as a reduction in per capita benefits or a different
distribution scheme that defrays the additional costs.2" Moreover,
courts lack the institutional competence to find this middle ground
between extension and nuiiification~' For these reasons, courts
should be especially wary of extension when the excluded class is
as large or larger than the favored class, or when extension results
in significant additional expenditures.
C. Delaying Enforcement of an Extension Judgment
One commentator recommends that a court should always ex-
tend the benefits to the disfavored class unless a severability clause
clearly provides for nullification. 1 ' However, where the legislature.
UCLA L. REv. 447 (1989).
207. See Schachter v. Canada, 93 D.L.R.4tb 1, 21 (1992).
208. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 95-96 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
209. Id. Middle ground extensions made by legislatures may also take benefits away
from the favored class. E.g., Schachter, 94 D.L.R.4th at 7.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 95 ("allocation and distribution of... funds are peculiarly within the prov-
ince of the Legislative Branch").
212. This is exactly what happened in Schachter. 93 D.L.R.4th at 7. Parliament's
amended statute reduced the maternity leave time from 15 to 10 weeks to defray the added
costs. See supra note 15. The legislature also adopted an intermediate position after the
Court's decision in Califano v. Westcott. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
214. Kovacic, supra note 73, at 88-89.
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is likely to repeal the extension, the court should delay the en-
forcement of its extension judgment.2 15 This commentator's pro-
posal solves the dilemma of judicial termination of the present re-
cipients' benefits.2 16 It may even help litigants overcome the hurdle
of standing, since this commentator's presumption of extension
can satisfy the requirement of redressability21 Finally, it is consis-
tent with the existing presumption that legislatures generally pre-
fer extension over nullification.2" 8 Extension of underinclusive enti-
tlement statutes, at first blush, makes perfect sense.
A deeper inquiry casts some doubt on this proposal, however.
First, this proposal does not resolve the theoretical inconsistencies
associated with a court making assumptions about the enacting
legislature's intended remedy.2 9 Second, it does not lessen the dif-
ficulties associated with determining the present legislature's reme-
dial intent.
220
Under this commentator's suggestion, the court must discover
the present legislature's remedial preference-how likely it is to re-
peal the extension. Such an inquiry is purely fictitious, since there
is no principled way to uncover what the present legislature would
do if given the choice.22
Additional concerns also question the wisdom in delaying en-
forcement of extension judgments. First, extrinsic factors such as
the relative sizes of the classes and budgetary impact might cause
the present legislature to prefer a middle ground solution. How-
ever, courts should not seek this middle ground due to separation
of powers concerns and because courts are ill-equipped to under-
take such an endeavour.2 22 Second, this presumption ignores the
reality of limited resources because the class of beneficiaries can-
not be expanded without increasing costs. Third, principles of fed-
eralism interfere with a federal court's determination of state pol-
icy, rendering such an approach untenable in this context.22
Finally, the presumption of extension may be inconsistent with the
right invoked in an equal protection suit. Extension as the sole
215. Id.
216. Id. at 89-90.
217.. Id. at 93-95; see supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
218. See Kovacic, supra note 73, at 90-93.
219. See supra part V.A.
220. See supra part V.B.
221. See supra part V.B.
222. See supra notes 92-98, 156 and accompanying text.
223. See supra part II.E.
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remedy may exceed the scope of the right to equal treatment.2 4
D. Delaying Enforcement of a Nullification Judgment
The Canadian doctrine allows the reviewing court to strike
down an entitlement statute, but delay enforcement of its order to
give Parliament time to amend the statute.2 2 5 The U.S. doctrine
generally does not allow this option2. Delayed enforcement is not
without precedent in the United States, however. The Supreme
Court has permitted unconstitutional statutes to remain in effect
for specified periods of time to give the legislature an opportunity
to amend.227
Delayed enforcement of nullification judgments is the least in-
trusive method of judicial interdiction. Courts of both the United
States and Canada should reconsider their use of this remedy.
Courts fulfil their legitimate remedial function when they grant re-
lief to the litigant by declaring the statute unconstitutional. Courts
need not repair the problem themselves. By delaying enforcement,
the courts transfer the problem to the li.gi.lnt.,1r by puttin +h,
legislature on notice that the statute will be stricken unless
amended.
A court does not overstep its bounds by "ordering" the legisla-
ture to act, since the legislature need not act at all. The legislature
may take no action and the court will strike down the statute and
224. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
225. See supra part II.C.
226. See supra part III.E. However, when reviewing state entitlement statutes, federal
courts often allow the statutes to remain in force while they remand the case to the state
court for application of the remedy. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. In Heckler
v. Mathews, the Court advocated delaying enforcement to protect reliance interests. 465
U.S. 728, 746 (1984) (dictum).
227. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88-89
(1982) (plurality opinion). The Court in staying its declaration of invalidity for three
months stated "[w]e think that it is for Congress to determine the proper manner of re-
structuring the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to conform to the requirements of Article III in the
way that will best effectuate the legislative purpose ...." Id. at 88 n.41. The Court con-
cluded the limited stay would "afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bank-
ruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication without impairing the interim
administration of the bankruptcy laws." Id. at 88; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142-
43 (1976) (per curiam) (Court stayed its declaration of invalidity for 30 days to "afford
Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the Commission by law or to adopt other valid
enforcement mechanisms without interrupting enforcement of the [sustained] provisions");
Beers, supra note 169, at 146 (advocating delayed enforcement for nullification judgments
to provide additional "flexibility which is most likely to lead to a 'rational result' in any
given case").
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its benefits. If the legislature amends the statute, it can achieve its
intent directly by reformulating the classes, funding, and imple-
mentation. It may amend, or re-enact the statute as it wishes. The
court need not be a proxy for the legislative will; the delayed en-
forcement remedy allows the current legislature to assert its own
prerogative.
Because entitlements are not constitutionally required in the
United States, when a court rules that the disbursement of an en-
titlement statute is discriminatory, the nullification and extension
remedies are equally legitimate. The right invoked is equal treat-
ment, not a right to the benefits themselves.22 8 All similarly situ-
ated persons must equally receive the benefits, or all must be de-
nied the benefits. If the remedies are intrinsically equal under the
U.S. Constitution, the reviewing court has no constitutional basis
on which to choose one remedy over the other. The court must
therefore rely entirely on policy and legislative intent.22 What
courts have done in fact is dress up policy as legislative intent.
Delayed enforcement solves this dilemma by allowing two
equal branches to perform their respective functions: courts fulfil
their role by granting relief to injured parties; and legislatures ful-
fil their role by redrafting the legislation. If courts truly desire a
constitutional remedy which implements the legislative will, their






Some commentators argue that in this context courts should
not allow the legislature to use severability clauses.2 3 ' They argue
that allowing the legislature to declare what the constitutional
remedy should be for the unconstitutional statute is actually
usurping the judicial function.23 2 More importantly, they assert, al-
228. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
229. Those who argue that there are normative values embodied in constitutions are
really making policy arguments. There is no principled method of ascertaining those values,
and no principled method of weighing them against each other when they are in competi-
tion. Rather, in any given instance, the weight of each factor will depend on the deci-
sionmaker's evaluation of the factor's intrinsic worth.
230. Duclos & Roach, supra note 37, at 19.
231. See, e.g., Miller, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 118, at 132-37; Miller &
Devins, supra note 118, at 156.
232. See Miller, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 118, at 132-33, 137.
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lowing the legislature to express a preference for nullification
would pose a threat to judicial review by removing the incentive to
bring lawsuits.
288
What these commentators overlook is that the U.S. Constitu-
tion does not mandate entitlements. Their existence depends solely
on the legislative intent behind their enactment and continued op-
eration. If the enacting legislature evinced an intent to nullify
rather than extend, the court should nullify. Legislatures subse-
quent to the statute's enaction could have removed or altered the
severability clause. Moreover, if the present legislature is unhappy
with the nullification, it can quickly re-enact the statute in
whatever form suits it, within constitutional parameters. The legis-
lature can also provide retroactive payments to the recipients.
2 8' 4
This quandary again highlights the utility of delayed enforce-
ment. A court can nullify the statute pursuant to the severability
clause, and then the present legislature can cure the infirmity
before the nullification judgment takes effect.
VTTT. CnLS TTQON
Finding a judicial remedy for underinclusive entitlement stat-
utes is a significant, perplexing problem. The Canadian Supreme
Court's new methodology is more judicially activist than the cur-
rent U.S. doctrine. By allowing a court to read new language into a
statute to extend the class, and by allowing delayed enforcement of
nullification judgments, the Canadian approach is certainly more
flexible than U.S. doctrine. Because of its checklist approach, it is
also more coherent.
But does it go too far? The answer depends on what the judi-
ciary is doing when it adds language to a statute or delays enforce-
ment of its judgment to allow the legislature to intervene.
Is adding language the logical equivalent of severance? Admit-
tedly, the effect may be the same. In either case the legislative will
may be enforced, or perverted as the judiciary wields its mighty
pen (or eraser). Both methods may do violence to the statute and
the legislative will, yet both are uniquely powerful tools to effect
positive social change.
The real problem with judicial redrafting by adding language
233. See Miller & Devins, supra note 118, at 152-53.
234. See Westcott, 443 U.S. at 96 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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is the source of the new language. If a court adds language to a
statute, it must be able to justify its source. The Canadian Su-
preme Court believes the language should come from legislative in-
tent and constitutional normative values, which it refers to loosely
as the "deeper social purposes of the Charter. '2 3' There are two
problems with the Canadian approach. First, there is a conceptual
difficulty with using legislative intent to insert language. Second,
the Court's reliance on normative values ignores legislative intent
and substitutes unaccountable judicial policy for a democratic leg-
islative policy.
There is an inherent contradiction in using legislative intent to
insert new language. Even if the court can unequivocally discern
the legislative intent, the legislature intended to enact only what it
enacted. It could intend nothing more.2 36 A court engages in ficti-
tious reasoning when it imputes a desire to the enacting legislature
for the court to add new words, unless the enacting legislature ac-
tually indicated this in the statute.
Perhaps the Canadian Supreme Court, like the United States
Supreme Court, seeks to solve this conundrum by merely asserting
a presumption that the enacting legislature would favor extension
and would prefer the judiciary to insert new language on Parlia-
ment's behalf if reading in is minimally intrusive and saves the
statute from nullification.3 " Like the U.S. doctrine, this presump-
tion can be rebutted by evidence of a contrary legislative intent.
Yet, both U.S. and Canadian courts face a major hurdle in em-
bracing these presumptions. In presuming the legislature would
favor extension, the court has merely made a policy judgment
based upon knowledge of what the legislature favors generally. '38
Once the court describes extrinsic factors such as increased costs
and relative class sizes, it leaves the realm of legislative intent. It
immerses itself entirely in policy, even if it tries to cloak that pol-
icy as legislative intent. The court can only speculate as to what
235. Schachter v. Canada, 93 D.L.R.4th 1, 13-14, 20-21 (1992); see also Duclos & Roach,
supra note 37, at 24-27. Caminker refers to these norms or values as "substantive constitu-
tional norms" and suggests that they should "guide the choice between nullification and
extension [to] implement whichever remedy best furthers the legislative purposes animating
the underlying statutory scheme." Caminker, supra note 35, at 1185. This "constitutional
hints" approach is new to Canadian jurisprudence. Duclos & Roach, supra note 37, at 24-26.
236. See Kovacic, supra note 73, at 58; see also supra part V.
237. See Schachter v. Canada, 93 D.L.R.4th 1, 25 (1992).
238. Id. (stating the Court's reasoning was "sensible given [its] knowledge of how legis-
latures act generally").
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the enacting legislature would wish given a circumstance it never
foresaw,"39 or on what the present legislature would wish, if it were
able to make that wish known.
2 10
The second problem with justifying the insertion of language
is the Canadian Court's reliance on normative constitutional val-
ues. Norms are wonderfully vague. Their use gives the judiciary
considerable latitude in enforcing citizens' rights. Unfortunately,
they give the judiciary too much discretion; in fact, nearly total
discretion.2 ' A substantive constitutional norm is anything the ju-
diciary says it is. Consider the words of Karl Llewellyn on norma-
tive generalizations:
To see that something is right, or that something is a right, is to
generalize. There is no practicable way, in ordinary life, to get at
the notion of rightness without having, somewhere in your mind,
a general picture or pattern which the case in hand fits into and
fits under. You do not have to put the standard into words; you
do not have to see it and know it as being a standard; it can be
as vague as "somehow." But it is there: the sensation, if that be
alI it is, that somehow "cases like this ought to be a l- t _ .. t-k 4.
way," or that action like this is out of line with what action
ought to be in general .... Being creative action, this norma-
tive generalizing can fasten on anything for its base, and can
move from that base in any range and any direction. Even a
fairy story-a single fairy story-can call up a normative gener-
alization about the right behavior of mice and pumpkins, and of
fairy godmothers and princes who have been experienced only in
a newly created imaginary environment.
242
By juggling values the judiciary may be undermining its own
legitimacy.2 4 If constitutional values change with the Constitu-
tion's interpreter, they are not constitutional values at all, but are
239. See supra notes 168-171 and accompanying text.
240. See supra part V.B.
241. "The inescapable reality of the Charter era is that the judiciary will inevitably be
drawn into making fundamental value choices. The issue is not whether . . . political
choices will be made by courts. The issue is whether those choices will be made well or
badly." PATRICK MONAHAN, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CHARTER, FEDERALISM AND
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 135 (1987).
242. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Normative, The Legal, and The Law-Jobs: The Problem
of Juristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1335, 1359-60 (1940).
243. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992)
(in an effort to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis and to protect the Court's legitimacy,
the majority refused to impose its own values on the decision of whether to make abortion
illegal).
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only the values of the interpreters. A review of United States Su-
preme Court decisions further reminds us that courts are not en-
tirely apolitical,"4 and judicial demagoguery may make even well-
meaning judges instruments of tyranny.24
There is a doctrinally sound solution. The remedy of delayed
enforcement deserves more attention both in Canada and the
United States. This remedy does the least violence to the doctrine
of separation of powers, is the most pragmatic of all the remedies,
and recognizes that entitlements are not generally constitutional
requirements.
The judiciary may want to exert its influence directly on the
choice of extension or nullification, since remedies are uniquely its
business. In the case of underinclusive entitlement statutes, how-
ever, once the judiciary pronounces the statute unconstitutional, it
has fulfilled its proper institutional function. It should generally
remand the remedial option entirely to the legislature so that the
legislature can decide, consistent with the Constitution, whether it
244. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619, 2622 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking. . . . It
takes little real detective work to discern just what has changed since [the decisions of two
previous cases]: this Court's own personnel."); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(launching the "Lochner-era" of judicial activism in laissez-faire economics); Plessy v.
Furguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (holding "equal but separate accommodations for the
white and colored races" were constitutional); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)
(holding blacks were not "persons" under the Constitution). Judges exacerbate this problem
when they step outside the judicial sphere and usurp the basic function of another branch.
"Basic to the constitutional structure established by the Framers was their recognition that
'[tihe accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.'" Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 47, at 300 (H. Lodge ed., 1888) (James Madison)).
245. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (where the Court used
national security and deference to the Executive Branch to justify internment of Japanese-
Americans in concentration camps during World War II); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927) (where the Court on utilitarian grounds refused to strike down a Virginia statute
which required the sterilization of mentally retarded persons: "It is better for all the world,
if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind
.... Three generations of imbeciles are enough."); Plessy v. Furguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540
(1896) (holding "equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races" were
constitutional); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating the public accommo-
dations sections of the 1875 Civil Rights Act); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141
(1872) (affirming a state court's denial of a license to practice law because the applicant was
female: "The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evi-
dently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . . [T]he domestic sphere . . .
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.") (Bradley, J., concurring).
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favors extension, extension with reduction in per capita distribu-
tion, or outright nullification. The legislature is best suited to
make the correct decision. Although the temptation is great to ex-
tend the benefits to everyone, courts should not rely on the legisla-
ture to correct judicial mistakes. Courts therefore should generally
delay enforcement of nullification judgments to allow the legisla-
ture time to formulate the best solution.
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